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Abstract
We develop a framework for modeling choice in the presence of framing e®ects. An extended
choice function assigns a chosen element to every pair (A;f) where A is a set of alternatives
and f is a frame. A frame includes observable information that is irrelevant in the rational
assessment of the alternatives, but nonetheless a®ects choice. We relate the new framework to
the classical model of choice correspondence. Conditions are identi¯ed under which there exists
either a transitive or a transitive and complete binary relation R such that an alternative x is
chosen in some (A;f) i® x is R-maximal in the set A. We then demonstrate that the framework
of choice correspondence misses information, which is essential to economic modeling and which
is incorporated in the extended choice function.
¤This paper extends and substitutes our previous paper \Two Comments on the Principle of Revealed Preference"
posted in June 2006. We thank Efe Ok, Andrea Prat and four anonymous referees for most useful comments.
11. Introduction
The traditional method used by economists to model a choice situation is to describe the set
of alternatives from which an economic agent makes his choice. Individual behavior is speci¯ed by
assigning to every choice situation a chosen alternative or a collection of possible choices without
further specifying how the indeterminacy among the possible choices is resolved.
Mounting evidence from psychology, as well as casual observation and introspection, indicates
that real-life behavior often depends on observable information, other than the set of feasible
alternatives, which is irrelevant in the rational assessment of the alternatives but nonetheless
a®ects behavior. A few examples: a voter may be in°uenced by the order in which candidates
are listed on a ballot; a consumer may condition an online purchase decision on the alternative
designated as the default by the retailer; and the choice of a vacation package from a catalogue may
depend on whether or not a casino table appears on the front page. We refer to such additional
information as a frame and to the dependence of choice on the frame as a framing e®ect.
This paper presents a framework for modeling choice in the presence of framing e®ects which
is in the spirit of recent developments in Bounded Rationality and Behavioral Economics. We
then relate the new framework to the classical model of choice.
Let X be a ¯nite set of alternatives. According to the standard approach, a choice problem is
a non-empty subset of X and a choice function attaches to every choice problem A µ X a single
element in A. The notion of a choice correspondence, which attaches to every choice problem A
a non-empty subset of A, is used to capture indeterminacy in choice.
We enrich the standard model with a set F of frames. For example, F may include various
orderings of the set X, a collection of default alternatives or a set of natural numbers interpreted
as the number of elements the decision maker can seriously evaluate. An extended choice problem
is a pair (A;f) where A µ X is a standard choice problem and f 2 F is a frame. An extended
choice function c assigns an element of A to every pair (A;f). An extended choice function
induces a choice correspondence by assigning to every set A all the elements chosen from A in
some frame.
Bernheim and Rangel (2007) independently develop a framework, called choice with ancillary
conditions that is similar to the framework of choice with frames. While they focus on the
discussion of welfare within the framework, we focus on relating the new framework to the standard
model of choice.
Caution should be exercised in applying the model of choice with frames. In many real-life
situations the decision maker faces a set of alternatives with additional information that is in fact
relevant in the rational assessment of the alternatives and thus should not be regarded as a frame.
For example, consider a \matchmaking" situation (A;f) where a male from the set A is to be
matched to a female f. In this case, the rational evaluation of a male in A di®ers as we vary the
female f. Matching the male m to the female f1 is considered by a rational matchmaker to be
a di®erent outcome than matching m to f2. Although this example can formally be included in
2the framework, it lies outside the scope of this paper, in which we assume that the frame a®ects
choice only as a result of procedural or psychological factors.
The standard model postulates the existence of a transitive and possibly complete binary
relation that describes behavior. In Section 3, we explore the boundaries of this postulate in the
context of choice with frames. We identify conditions under which there exists either a transitive
or alternatively a transitive and complete binary relation R, such that an element x is chosen in
some extended choice problem (A;f) if and only if x is R-maximal in the set A. The asymmetric
component of the relation R must relate x to y if and only if x is chosen over y in all extended
choice problems (fx;yg;f). This relation has already appeared in the speci¯c contexts of choice
from lists (Rubinstein and Salant, 2006a) and choice with a default alternative (Rubinstein and
Salant, 2006b). Bernheim and Rangel (2007) independently use a similar binary relation.
In Section 4, we discuss the limitations of the model of choice correspondence, and the max-
imization of a binary relation in particular, in describing behavior when the decision maker is
a®ected by framing. We present examples of extended choice functions for which the induced
choice correspondence misses essential information about choice. In fact, the choice correspon-
dence may carry no information about decision making. In addition, we discuss examples of
extended choice functions where the induced correspondence cannot be described by maximizing
a preference relation, or alternatively it can but the relation is very far from what we would
naturally consider to be the underlying preferences of the decision maker.
Thus, the existence of a binary relation, the maximization of which can describe behavior, does
not imply that the details of a frame-sensitive choice procedure are super°uous. On the contrary,
in order to construct rich economic models one often needs a model of choice with frames. In
Section 5, we conclude by exploring one such example.
2. Examples of extended choice functions
In this section, we discuss several extended choice models and provide an example of an
extended choice function for each.
2.1 Default alternative
In this model, one of the alternatives is designated as the default. The collection of frames F
is taken to be X. An extended choice problem is a pair (A;x) where x 2 X denotes the default
alternative that may or may not be available for choice. Zhou (1997), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005,
2006) and Sagi (2006) study axiomatizations within this model.
Example 1. A decision maker has in mind two functions u and ¯ from X to the reals. Given
an extended choice problem (A;x), he chooses x if x 2 A and u(x) + ¯(x) ¸ u(a) for every other
element a 2 A; otherwise, he chooses the u-maximal element in A. Status-quo bias is modeled by
taking ¯(x) to be positive.
2.2 List
3The set of alternatives is presented to the decision maker in the form of a list. An extended
choice problem is a pair (A;>) where > is an ordering of X. Rubinstein and Salant (2006a) study
axiomatizations within this model.
Example 2. Satis¯cing (Simon (1955)). A decision maker has in mind a value function
v : X ! R and an aspiration threshold v¤. Given a pair (A;>), he chooses the >-¯rst element in
A with a value above v¤. If there are none, the >-last element in A is chosen.
2.3 Limited attention
There is a limit on the number of alternatives that the decision maker can actually consider.
This number re°ects the amount of attention the decision maker devotes to the choice problem.
An extended choice problem is a pair (A;n) where n is the number of alternatives the decision
maker can actually consider.
Example 3. A decision maker has in mind two orderings: an \attention" ordering O of
X, which determines the alternatives he focuses on, and a \preference" ordering P summarizing
his preferences. Given (A;n), the decision maker chooses the P-best element among the ¯rst
minfn;jAjg elements in A according to the ordering O.
2.4 Advertisement
The intensity of advertising the alternatives within the set X may vary. A frame assigns to
every element in X a natural number interpreted as the number of advertisements for this element.
However, not all elements in X are available for choice. Thus, an extended choice problem is a
pair (A;i) where A is the set of elements available for choice and i is a function that assigns a
natural number to every x 2 X.
Example 4. A decision maker has in mind a \weight" function u. Given a pair (A;i), he
chooses the element a 2 A which maximizes i(x)u(x) over all x 2 A.
2.5 Gradual accessibility
The alternatives are revealed to the decision maker in two stages. In the ¯rst stage, the
decision maker is unable to assess the alternatives that will appear in the second stage. An
extended choice problem is a pair (A;R) where A is the set of elements available for choice in
the two stages, R µ X is the set of elements appearing in the ¯rst stage and X ¡ R is the set of
elements appearing in the second stage.
Example 5. A decision maker has in mind two functions u and v and a value u¤. Given a
problem (A;R), he chooses the u-best element in A \ R if that element passes the threshold u¤
or if R ¶ A. Otherwise, he chooses the v-best element in A ¡ R.
2.6 Deadline
The amount of time that the decision maker can invest in the choice problem is limited. An
extended choice problem is a pair (A;t) where t is interpreted as the deadline for making a choice.
4Example 6. The decision maker needs time to process the di®erent alternatives. Let v be a
value function and d a processing time function with the interpretation that an alternative x is
available for choice only after d(x) time units. Given a pair (A;t), the decision maker chooses the
v-maximal alternative from among the elements in A with d(x) · t.
Note that extended choice functions assign a chosen element to every pair (A;f), where A µ X
and f 2 F. In some cases, it makes sense to restrict the domain of the choice function. For
example, in the default model, if the default alternative is always available for choice, the domain
of extended choice problems should be restricted to those pairs (A;x) where x 2 A. In other
cases, it seems reasonable to require that the extended function satisfy an invariance property.
For example, in the list model, in which the frame is an ordering over the entire set X, it makes
sense to require that a choice function assign the same element to any two extended choice
problems (A;>1) and (A;>2) that order the elements of A identically.
3. Choice with frames and the standard choice model
The interpretation of a choice correspondence C is that the set C(A) contains all the elements
that are chosen from the set A under certain circumstances. With this interpretation in mind, an
extended choice function c induces a choice correspondence Cc, where Cc(A) is the set of elements
chosen from the set A in some frame f. That is,
Cc(A) = fx j c(A;f) = x for some f 2 Fg:
The induced choice correspondence re°ects the data available to an observer who is able to
view the choices of the decision maker but ignores the frames or alternatively, knows that the
choices of the decision maker are frame-sensitive but does not have information on the actual
frame.
In this section, we analyze the relationship between the model of choice with frames and the
standard model of choice correspondence. We discuss three results establishing that a choice
correspondence satisfying certain properties is indistinguishable from an extended choice function
satisfying analogous properties.
Observation I. Without imposing any structure, the two models are indistinguishable if the
frames are not directly observable or if they are ignored. That is, for every choice correspondence
C, there exists an extended choice function c such that C = Cc.
Indeed, let C be a choice correspondence. Let F = X and de¯ne
c(A;x) =
(
x if x 2 C(A)
some y 2 C(A) if x = 2 C(A) :
Clearly, C = Cc.
5Observation II. We now investigate circumstances in which an extended choice function can
be represented in the correspondence sense as the maximization of a transitive (but not necessarily
complete) binary relation. When such a representation is possible, the binary relation is often
interpreted as re°ecting the decision maker's well-being. In Rubinstein (2006) and Rubinstein and
Salant (2007), we express our reservations regarding this approach. We argue that identifying
choices with well-being involves a strong assumption, and that the two concepts are in principle
independent of one another.
We focus on extended choice functions in which the frame \triggers" the use of a particular
rationale by the individual when making a choice. Formally:
Salient Consideration. An extended choice function c is a Salient Consideration function
if for every frame f 2 F, there exists a corresponding ordering Âf such that c(A;f) is the
Âf-maximal element in A.
Thus, a Salient Consideration function c induces a correspondence Cc that assigns to every
set A all the elements of A that are maximal according to at least one frame-driven consideration.
In particular, no element in Cc(A) is Pareto-dominated with respect to the array of rationales
fÂfgf2F by any other element in A.
Of the examples discussed in Section 2, examples 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 are Salient Consideration






u(x) + M if x 2 R and u(x) ¸ u¤
v(x) if x = 2 R
u(x) ¡ M if x 2 R and u(x) < u¤ :
for a large enough M. Example 3 is not a Salient Consideration function. Indeed, if xOyOz but
zPyPx, then c(fx;y;zg;2) = y while c(fy;zg;2) = z.
For any asymmetric and transitive binary relation Â, let CÂ be the choice correspondence
de¯ned by CÂ(A) = fx 2 A j there is no y 2 A such that y Â xg.
We now show that the following two explanations of a choice correspondence C are indistin-
guishable in terms of choice observations when the frame is ignored:
(i) C = CÂ for some asymmetric and transitive (but possibly incomplete) binary relation Â.
(ii) C = Cc for some Salient Consideration function c satisfying property °¡extended.
Property °¡extended. If c(A;f) = x and c(B;g) = x, then there exists a frame h such
that c(A [ B;h) = x.
Property °¡extended is satis¯ed by all the examples in Section 2. In example 1, let h = x;
in example 2, let h be an ordering in which x appears ¯rst if x is satisfactory or an ordering in
which x appears last otherwise; in example 3, let h = jfa 2 A [ B s.t. aOxgj + 1; in example 4,
let h(x) = f(x) + g(x) and h(y) = minff(y);g(y)g for every y 6= x; in example 5, let h = x if
u(x) ¸ u¤ and h = f [ g n fxg otherwise; and in example 6, let h be t(x).
6Proposition 1. A choice correspondence C satis¯es C = CÂ for some asymmetric and
transitive binary relation Â if and only if there is a Salient Consideration function c satisfying
property °¡extended, such that C = Cc.
Proof. Assume that C = CÂ where Â is asymmetric and transitive. For every element a 2 X,
let Âa be an extension of Â to a complete order relation in which only the elements in the set
fb j b Â ag are ranked above a (the assumption that Â is transitive and not merely acyclic is
necessary for the construction). Let F = X. De¯ne a Salient Consideration function c as follows:
c(A;a) is the Âa-maximal element in A.
The function c satis¯es property °¡extended. If c(A;a) = x = c(B;b), then x is Â-maximal in
both A and B, which means that x is Â-maximal in the set A[B and therefore x = c(A[B;x).
It remains to verify that Cc = CÂ. If x 2 CÂ(A), then for no y 2 A does y Â x. Therefore,
for all y 2 A, x Âx y. Hence, c(A;x) = x which implies that x 2 Cc(A). Conversely, if x 2 Cc(A),
then there exists a frame a, such that c(A;a) = x. If there were an element y 2 A such that
y Â x, then by de¯nition y Âa x and thus x could not be Âa-maximal in A. Thus, x 2 CÂ(A).
In the other direction, assume that c is a Salient Consideration function satisfying property
°¡extended. Since c is a Salient Consideration function, the correspondence Cc satis¯es the
following two properties:
Property ®. If x 2 B µ A and x 2 Cc(A) then x 2 Cc(B).
Property ®+. If Cc(A) is a singleton and Cc(A) 2 B µ A then Cc(B) = Cc(A).
Since c satis¯es property °¡extended, the correspondence Cc also satis¯es:
Property °. If x 2 Cc(A) \ Cc(B) then x 2 Cc(A [ B).
Lemma 1 relates properties ®, ®+ and ° to the maximization of a transitive binary relation
and thus concludes the proof.
Lemma 1. A choice correspondence C satis¯es properties ®, ®+ and ° if and only if there
exists an asymmetric and transitive binary relation Â, such that C = CÂ.
Proof. It is easy to verify that CÂ satis¯es all three properties. In the other direction, Sen
(1971) shows that if a choice correspondence C satis¯es properties ® and °, then there exists an
asymmetric and acyclic binary relation Â such that C = CÂ. To see that Â is also transitive,
assume that x Â y and y Â z. Then C(fx;yg) = fxg and C(fy;zg) = fyg. By property ®, the
alternatives y and z do not belong to C(fx;y;zg) and thus C(fx;y;zg) = fxg. By property ®+,
C(fx;zg) = fxg, which implies that x Â z. ¥
When we start with an extended choice function c, the binary relation Â constructed in
Proposition 1 must be de¯ned by x Â y if Cc(fx;yg) = fxg (as in Sen (1971)). Thus, x Â y if and
only if c(fx;yg;f) = x for every frame f. Bernheim and Rangel (2007) de¯ne a similar binary
relation: xP¤y if for every set A such that x;y 2 A, c(A;f) 6= y for every frame f. By de¯nition,
P¤ is acyclic. The relation Â is ¯ner than P¤ and thus property °-extended is required to assure
7its acyclicity. Property ®+ assures its transitivity.
Note that it is sometimes possible to represent an extended choice function as maximizing a
transitive binary relation even when it is not a Salient Consideration function. We discuss an
example in Section 5.
Observation III. We now investigate conditions under which an extended choice function
is \behaviorally equivalent" to the maximization of a complete and transitive binary relation.
For any complete and transitive relation %, let C%(A) = fx 2 A j x % y for every y 2 Ag. In
order to state Observation III, we need to strengthen property °¡extended:
Property °+¡extended. If c(A;f) = x, c(B;g) = y and y 2 A, then there exists a frame
h such that c(A [ B;h) = x.
Note that restricting property °+¡extended to the case in which y = x results in property
°¡extended.
Examples 2 and 4 satisfy property °+¡extended, while the remaining examples do not. Let
X = fx;y;zg. In example 1, let v(x) = 1, v(y) = 2, v(z) = 3 and ¯ ´ 1:5. Then c(fx;yg;x) = x
and c(fy;zg;y) = y but x is never chosen from fx;y;zg. A similar situation occurs in example 3
if zOxOy and yPzPx; in example 5 if u(z) > u¤ > u(x) > u(y) and v(y) > v(z) > v(x); and in
example 6 if v(y) > v(z) > v(x) but d(z) < d(x) < d(y).
The next result states that the following two explanations of a choice correspondence C are
indistinguishable when ignoring the frame:
(i) C = C% for some complete and transitive binary relation % .
(ii) C = Cc for some Salient Consideration function that satis¯es property °+¡extended.
Proposition 2. A choice correspondence C satis¯es C = C% for a complete and transitive
binary relation % if and only if there is a Salient Consideration function c satisfying property
°+¡extended, such that C = Cc.
Proof. Let C = C% where % is complete and transitive and let Â be its asymmetric
component. By de¯nition, CÂ = C%. Constructing a Salient Consideration function c as in the
proof of Proposition 1, we obtain that Cc = CÂ = C%.
To see that c satis¯es property °+¡extended, note that if c(A;a) = x and c(B;b) = y 2 A,
then x is %-maximal in A and y is %-maximal in B. By y 2 A and the fact that % is complete
and transitive, x is %-maximal in the set A [ B and thus x = c(A [ B;x).
In the other direction, let c be a Salient Consideration function satisfying property °+¡extended.
As in Proposition 1, the correspondence Cc satis¯es properties ® and ®+. Property °+¡extended
implies the following property of Cc:
Property °+. If x 2 Cc(A), y 2 Cc(B) and y 2 A, then x 2 Cc(A [ B).
Lemma 2 relates properties ®, ®+ and °+ to the maximization of a complete and transitive
8binary relation and thus concludes the proof:
Lemma 2. A choice correspondence C satis¯es properties ®, ®+ and °+ if and only if there
exists a complete and transitive binary relation %, such that C = C%.
Proof. The only if part is immediate. Assume C satis¯es properties ®, ®+ and °+. Then C
also satis¯es property ° and thus by Lemma 1 there exists an asymmetric and transitive binary
relation Â, such that C = CÂ. We expand Â to a complete relation % by de¯ning x » y for every
two elements x and y, such that x  y and y  x. Clearly, C = C%. To see that % is transitive it
is su±cient to show that » is transitive. Assume that x » y and y » z. Then, z 2 C(fy;zg) and
y 2 C(fx;yg). By property °+, z 2 C(fx;y;zg) and thus z 2 C(fx;zg) by property ®, implying
that x  z. Similarly, z  x and thus x » z. ¥
4. Between the two frameworks
Propositions 1 and 2 identify conditions under which a Salient Consideration function induces
a correspondence that can be represented as the maximization of a transitive (and possibly com-
plete) binary relation. We now discuss the limitations of the model of choice correspondence,
and the maximization of a binary relation in particular, in describing behavior when the decision
maker is a®ected by framing.
First, a choice correspondence induced by an extended choice function may miss essential
information about choice. Consider example 4 in the Advertisement model where c(A;i) =
argmaxx2A i(x)u(x). In that case, Cc(A) = A for any choice problem A. This is the coarsest
possible choice correspondence and it carries no information about decision making.
Second, reasonable extended choice functions induce choice correspondences that cannot be
described as the maximization of a transitive binary relation. Consider, for example, a decision
maker who has in mind an ordering xOyOz. He is observed making choices in each of two
frames which are interpreted as moods. In a Good mood he maximizes O and in a Bad mood he
minimizes O. In this case, Cc(fx;y;zg) = fx;zg and thus any binary relation % that explains Cc
must yield either x Â y or z Â y. However, Cc(fx;yg) = fx;yg and Cc(fy;zg) = fy;zg, which is
a contradiction.
Third, even when there exists a transitive relation that explains the extended choice function,
its interpretation may not be straightforward. The explanatory relation combines the preferences
of the decision maker and the procedure he is using, but does not allow distinguishing between the
two. Consider example 3 in the Limited Attention model. An extended choice problem is a pair
(A;n) and the extended choice function c picks the P-best element among the ¯rst minfn;jAjg
elements in A according to the ordering O. Then, the explanatory binary relation must be de¯ned
by a Â b if aPb and aOb. (If aPb and aOb, then b is never chosen from fa;bg and thus it must
be that a Â b. If bPa, then c(fa;bg;2) = b and thus a  b and if bOa, then c(fa;bg;1) = b and
thus a  b.) Let us verify that CÂ = Cc. If a 2 CÂ(A), then there is no x 2 A such that xPa
and xOa and thus c(A;n) = a for n = jfx 2 A s.t. xOagj + 1. If a = 2 CÂ(A), then there is an
element b such that bOa and bPa and thus a is never chosen from (A;n) for every n. Note that
9the relation Â treats the two relations P and O completely identically even though one of them
expresses the preferences of the decision maker while the other is merely the attention ordering.
Similarly, when an extended choice function c induces a choice correspondence Cc, which can
be described as the maximization of a preference relation %, the interpretation of the symmetric
component of % does not necessarily have any indi®erence meaning. Recall example 2 in the List
model in which the decision maker chooses the ¯rst element x in the list which satis¯es v(x) > v¤
and the last element otherwise. The binary relation %, for which Cc = C%, can be represented by
the utility function u(x) = 1 if v(x) > v¤ and 0 otherwise. (To see this, note that a satisfactory
element a is %-maximal in A and thus a 2 C%(A). It is also chosen from A when it appears ¯rst
in the ordering and thus a 2 Cc(A). A non-satisfactory element a appears in C%(A) only when
there are no satisfactory elements in A. It appears in Cc(A) only if A does not include satisfactory
elements and a appears last among the elements of A.) But the seemingly indi®erence between
two elements does not imply that the decision maker is indecisive or indi®erent between them.
One could argue that for practical purposes resolving this indi®erence between the satisfactory
elements is immaterial since it does not in°uence choice. This is not quite accurate. For example,
if a social planner is able to a®ect the ordering of the alternatives, he would want v-better elements
to appear earlier in the ordering.
5. Limited attention
As demonstrated in Section 4, the existence of a binary relation whose maximization describes
behavior does not imply that the details of a frame-sensitive choice procedure are super°uous.
These details on how an economic agent's behavior varies with respect to observable entities are
summarized by the extended choice function. Thus, extended choice functions may be the basis
for richer economic models that provide an explanation of how seemingly unimportant observables
can a®ect the interaction of economic agents. In preparation for such models, it makes sense to
consider families of extended choice functions that have a strong structure. Let us conclude by
discussing a simple example.
In the Limited Attention model, an extended choice problem is a pair (A;n) where A is the
set of available alternatives and n is the number of elements that the decision maker is capable of
evaluating. The number n may be thought of as a measure, which is sometimes observable, of the
attention the decision maker devotes to the choice problem. We restrict attention to pairs (A;n)
where n · jAj.
We now characterize the class of extended choice functions described in example 3. An
extended choice function in this class is parameterized by two orderings O and P, such that
cO;P(A;n) is the P-best element among the n elements in A that appear ¯rst according to O.
The procedure behind this class of extended choice functions has similarities to other two-
staged choice procedures suggested in the literature, in which the decision maker constructs an
attention set in the ¯rst stage, and chooses the best element within this set in the second stage.
In the procedure discussed here, the attention set consists of the ¯rst n elements according to the
10attention ordering O. In Manzini and Mariotti (2007)'s Rational Shortlist Method, the attention
set consists of all elements in A that are not dominated according to a basic binary relation.
Another binary relation is then used for maximization within the attention set. In Eliaz and
Spiegler (2007), the decision maker is a buyer who faces the menus of two sellers. He constructs
a consideration set consisting of the goods o®ered by the ¯rst seller and add those o®ered by the
second seller if one of them is similar to the best good o®ered by the ¯rst seller.
Three properties characterize the class of all extended choice functions cO;P.
The ¯rst property states that if alternative a is more accessible to the decision maker than
alternative b, then for every set A that contains a and b, the decision maker will not choose b if
he devotes little attention to the deliberation process:
Attention 1. If c(fa;bg;1) = a, then for every set A that contains a and b, c(A;1) 6= b.
The second property states that if alternative a is chosen over b when the decision maker
considers both of them, then for every set A that contains a and b, the decision maker will not
choose b when he considers all the elements in the set A:
Attention 2. If c(fa;bg;2) = a, then for every set A, c(A;jAj) 6= b.
The third property states that adding an element x to a set A, where x is less accessible than
all the elements of A, does not alter choice as long as the amount of attention the decision maker
devotes to the deliberation process remains the same:
Attention 3. If c(A;k) = a and c(fx;yg;1) = y for every y 2 A, then c(A [ fxg;k) = a.
Clearly, any extended choice function cO;P satis¯es Attention 3. To see that cO;P satis¯es
Attention 1, note that cO;P(fa;bg;1) = a implies that aOb and thus b is not chosen from any set
A that contains a and b, when only one element is considered. To see that c satis¯es Attention
2, note that cO;P(fa;bg;2) = a implies that aPb and thus b is not chosen from any set A that
contains a and b, when all the elements of A are considered.
Any extended choice function c that satis¯es the three Attention properties is identical to cO;P
where the relations O and P are de¯ned by aOb if c(fa;bg;1) = a and aPb if c(fa;bg;2) = a.
To see this, note that the relations O and P are complete and asymmetric. The relation O is
transitive. Assume that xOy, yOz and zOx and without loss of generality let c(fx;y;zg;1) = x.
By Attention 1, zOx implies that c(fx;y;zg;1) 6= x, which is a contradiction. The relation P is
also transitive. Assume that xPy, yPz and zPx and without loss of generality let c(fx;y;zg;3) =
x. By Attention 2, zPx implies that c(fx;y;zg;3) 6= x, which is a contradiction.
Finally, c(A;k) is the P-maximal element among the ¯rst k elements according to O. To
see this, let B be the set of the ¯rst k elements in A according to O. Then, by Attention 2,
b = c(B;k) is the P-maximal element in B. Otherwise, there is an element a 2 B such that aPb
and Attention 2 implies that c(B;k) 6= b. Since for every element x 2 A ¡ B and a 2 B we have
aOx, we obtain by Attention 3 that c(A;k) = c(B;k).
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